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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-3248
____________
RICHARD OLASZ, SR.,
                    Appellant
   v.
WILLIAM F. WELSH; FRANK DIENER; DAVID HAINES
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-00348)
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 29, 2008
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 14, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Richard Olasz, Sr., appeals the order of the District Court granting
summary judgment to Appellee William F. Welsh on Olasz’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim.  The District Court found that Olasz did not demonstrate a First
2Amendment violation and therefore could not sustain a claim for malicious prosecution
pursuant to § 1983.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
During all relevant times, Olasz was a member and Welsh was the president of the
West Mifflin Borough Council.  At Borough Council meetings on March 16, 2004 and
May 18, 2004, Welsh ruled that Olasz was out of order and eventually instructed the
police to remove him from the meetings.  Thereafter, criminal complaints were filed
against Olasz for his behavior at the meetings, but an Allegheny County District
Magistrate dismissed all charges.  Olasz initiated a malicious prosecution suit under
§ 1983 alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights to free speech and free
assembly.  Olasz alleged that Welsh “would regularly and wrongfully rule that [Olasz]
was ‘out of order’” in violation of his First Amendment rights.  Olasz admitted to
speaking out at the Borough Council meetings, and in fact “speak[ing] loudly while being
gaveled” by Welsh, but he averred that his behavior was necessary in order to be heard.
The District Court granted summary judgment as to Olasz’s First Amendment
claims.  The District Court recognized the government’s limited power to restrict speech
on public property, but also noted the permissibility of content-related regulation under
3certain circumstances, provided the regulation remains viewpoint neutral.  Turning to the
facts of this case, the District Court found that Olasz “was called out of order for being
disruptive and/or not addressing agenda items,” and that restricting such behavior
constitutes an appropriate time, place, and manner regulation of a public forum.  The
District Court quoted Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir.
2004), for the proposition that a certain degree of regulation of speech at public meetings
is necessary to avoid “allow[ing] a speaker to try to hijack the proceedings, or to filibuster
them, [which] would impinge on the First Amendment rights of other would-be
participants.”  Because the District Court found that Olasz could not establish an
underlying First Amendment violation, the District Court concluded that Olasz’s § 1983
malicious prosecution claim must fail.  Olasz timely appealed the District Court’s order.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of
a district court order granting summary judgment is plenary.  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch.
Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 170
(3d Cir. 1998)).  Summary judgment may be granted where “there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact,” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and the nonmovant is entitled to every
4reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record.  Merkle, 211 F.3d at 788 (citing
Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997)).
III.
In Merkle, we explained that “a claim of malicious prosecution under section 1983
cannot be based on substantive due process considerations, but instead must be based on a
provision of the Bill of Rights providing ‘an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection.’”  211 F.3d at 792 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)). 
Expanding our interpretation of Albright, in Torres we stated that “a section 1983
malicious prosecution claim could be based on a constitutional provision other than the
Fourth Amendment, including the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, so
long as it was not based on substantive due process.”  163 F.3d at 173.  Thus, our caselaw
clearly establishes that the analysis of a malicious prosecution claim arising under § 1983
must begin with a determination of whether a constitutional violation exists.
In the present case, Olasz alleges a violation of his First Amendment right to free
speech.  We have noted in prior cases that “when a public official excludes a [sic] elected
representative or citizen from a public meeting, she must conform her conduct to the
requirements of the First Amendment.”  Montiero v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 404
(3d Cir. 2006) (citing Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281).  While “content-based restrictions on
speech in a public forum are subject to strict-scrutiny,” Montiero, 436 F.3d at 404, we
have determined that “under contemporary public forum jurisprudence, a designated (as
5opposed to traditional) forum is reviewed under a sliding standard that allows for content-
related regulation so long as the content is tied to the limitations that frame the scope of
the designation, and so long as the regulation is neutral as to viewpoint within the subject
matter of that content.”  Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281.  “Viewpoint-based restrictions
violate the First Amendment regardless of whether they also serve some valid time, place,
manner interest.”  Montiero, 436 F.3d at 404.
In Eichenlaub, we considered whether a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit established a
violation of his First Amendment petition and free speech rights based on the curtailment
of his speech during a public meeting and his removal from the meeting.  385 F.3d at
279-81.  To analyze the First Amendment claim, we addressed the issue of whether the
“citizen’s forum” portion of a city board of supervisors meeting was a public forum or a
limited public forum.  Id. at 281.  We noted that even the public discussion portion of the
meeting was limited in scope to matters relating to the local government and that the
meeting was not the equivalent of a traditional public forum such as a public street or
park.  Id.  In light of the Supreme Court’s determination that “‘public bodies may confine
their meetings to specified subject matter,’” id. (quoting City of Madison Joint School
District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976)),
we reached the conclusion that “matters presented at a citizen’s forum may be limited to
issues germane to town government.”  Id.
6Against this backdrop, we determined that the plaintiff in Eichenlaub could not
establish a First Amendment violation because restricting behavior that was “repetitive
and truculent,” and involved “repeatedly interrupt[ing] the chairman of the meeting,”
constituted “the sort of time, place, and manner regulation that passes muster under the
most stringent scrutiny for a public forum.”  Id.  We explained that to the extent the
restrictions on the plaintiff’s speech “were not strictly content-neutral, the chairman’s
actions served the function of confining the discussion to the purpose of the meeting,” but
we ultimately concluded that the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff derived from a
“perfectly sustainable and content-neutral desire to prevent [the plaintiff’s] badgering,
constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum.”  Id.
On appeal, Olasz argues that, under Merkle, the correct standard for analyzing a
motion for summary judgment with respect to a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is
whether “no reasonable inference can be drawn that Appellant’s speech was at least one
factor in the decision to prosecute the Appellant.”  This argument is without merit both
because it misconstrues the test we used in Merkle and because it fails to recognize that
the Merkle test applied to a claim different than the one pursued by Olasz.  The plaintiff
in Merkle was a school teacher who publicly expressed criticism of certain policies of the
school district in which she was employed.  When criminal charges were later brought
against the teacher stemming from her attempt to remove art supplies from the school, she
claimed that the criminal prosecution was instituted in retaliation for her outspoken
7comments.  Merkle, 211 F.3d at 793.  We employed a three-step test to analyze her
retaliation claim, looking first at whether the plaintiff “demonstrate[d] that her speech
was protected,” second at whether the plaintiff could “show that her speech was a
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action,” and third at whether the defendants
could defeat the plaintiff’s claim “by establishing that [they] would have taken the same
adverse action against [the plaintiff] even in the absence of her protected speech.”  Id.
(citations omitted).
The Merkle test does not apply to the present case because Olasz did not allege that
the criminal prosecution was initiated in retaliation of his protected speech.  Nonetheless,
even if we interpreted Olasz’s allegations to state such a claim, the appropriate analysis
must still begin with a review of whether a First Amendment violation can be established. 
It would be inappropriate for a court to consider the second prong of the test (i.e., the
defendant’s motivation for the retaliatory action), as Olasz urges, without finding that the
first prong is met (i.e., the plaintiff’s speech was protected).  Because Olasz fails to
demonstrate that he engaged in protected speech and his rights under the First
Amendment were violated, his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim cannot advance.
Olasz’s claim with respect to “[t]he record of political and policy differences
between Appellant and Appellee,” does not give rise to the inference that Welsh’s actions
constituted impermissible viewpoint-based regulation of Olasz’s speech.  The essence of
Olasz’s allegations of a free speech violation is that Welsh’s “constant ‘out-of-order’
8rulings squelch free speech,” and Welsh’s “true motives are to silence” Olasz because of
the political rivalry between the two men.  This simply does not establish an
unconstitutional infringement upon Olasz’s protected First Amendment speech.  As in
Eichenlaub, Welsh’s actions at the two Borough Council meetings to constrain Olasz’s
“badgering, constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum,” 385 F.3d at
281, constitute appropriate time, place, and manner regulations.  Even when viewing
Olasz’s general allegations of differing political opinions in a light most favorable to
Olasz, he is unable to demonstrate that Welsh’s actions amounted to viewpoint regulation
in violation of the First Amendment.
We agree with the District Court that Welsh’s actions “served the function of
adhering to rules of decorum and confining the discussion to the purpose of the meeting,”
and that restricting Olasz’s disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and
manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum. 
Therefore, we find that Olasz suffered no First Amendment violation on which to base his
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
